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Democratisation beyond Capitalist Time: 
Temporalities of Transition in the Middle East after the Arab Uprisings 
 
 
Trapped in the premises of the transition ‘paradogma’, democratisation and authoritarian 
persistence literature are limited by a linear and continuous understanding of time, a 
gradualist view of transition, and a procedural definition of democracy. These analytical and 
normative strictures are compounded by a methodological nationalism that prevents an 
appreciation of how global factors shape the parameters for political transformation in the 
contemporary Middle East. Inspired by Gramsci’s theory of history, this paper seeks to move 
beyond these limitations and explore the prospect of transition as rupture, away from 
democratisation as strategy for ensuring duration of capitalist time, and towards democratic 
transition as epochal change beyond capitalism. By counterposing the effects of the two 
globalisations and the decolonisation in between on the prospects of political transformation 
in the Middle East, this paper argues that the Arab uprisings provide an opportunity for 
thinking globally and rupturally about political time, transition and democracy in the region. 
 
 














Democratisation beyond Capitalist Time: 




In 2011, the Arab uprisings appeared to many observers as a rupture in the history of 
authoritarian rule in the Middle East and North Africa. As much as it led to the greatest wave 
of popular mobilisation of this century, seven years on it is difficult to maintain that the 
uprisings provided such a clean break with the past. This outcome has yet again been 
processed by the democratisation literature as a result of the missing preconditions for a 
democratic transition.1 The literature on authoritarian persistence has similarly looked for 
distinctive features in the region that have hampered or reversed regime change, for instance 
focusing on the adaptability of incumbents to changing circumstances.2 
This paper argues that this view is partial, and suggests that both democratisation and 
authoritarian persistence literature suffer from two significant limitations.3 Firstly, they are 
characterised by a methodological nationalism that prevents them from adequately 
appreciating the extent to which global transformations have affected the conditions of 
existence of different social formations, especially in the periphery of the global political 
economy. While in the Middle East this tendency veers towards a ‘methodological 
regionalism’, the limits in appreciating the structuring impact of global transformations on 
the prospects of democratic transition locally remain apparent. Secondly, both 
democratisation and authoritarian persistence literature do not pay sustained attention to 
                                                          
1 Alfred Stepan & Juan Linz (2013) Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’, Journal of Democracy, 
24(2), pp. 15-30; Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk (2016) The Arab Spring: A Fourth Wave of 
Democratization?, Digest of Middle East Studies, 25(1), pp. 52-69; Philippe Schmitter & Nadine Sika (2017) 
Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa: A More Ambidextrous Process?, Mediterranean 
Politics, 22(4), pp. 443-463. 
2 Joshua Stacher (2012) Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press); Steven Heydemann & Reinoud Leenders (eds.) (2013) Middle East Authoritarianisms: 
Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
3 This paper takes a comprehensive definition of democratisation, which includes both the first-
generation approach informed by modernisation theory and the more elite-centred ‘transitology’ 
approach. See Terry L. Karl & Philippe Schmitter (1991) Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern 
and Eastern Europe, International Social Science Journal, 128(2), pp. 267-282. Similarly, authoritarian 
persistence literature encompasses all approaches emphasising continuity in and adaptation of 
authoritarian rule, in the form of ‘resilience’, ‘upgrading’ or ‘learning’. See Ray Hinnebusch (2006) 
Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique, 
Democratization, 13(3), pp. 373-395; Steven Heydemann & Reinoud Leenders (2011) Authoritarian 




time and temporality, and their definition of transition and democracy suffers from this. 
Political time is implied as fundamentally continuous. Transition is conceived in gradualist 
terms, so that, while possibly triggered by radical mass mobilisation, it is expected to occur 
along an elite-led path similar to the one experienced in third-wave ‘pacted’ or ‘imposed’ 
transitions.4 Finally, democracy is defined in the liberal-procedural terms of Dahl’s 
polyarchy.5 Because of these choices, both bodies of literature tend to overlook discontinuous, 
abrupt, and non-procedural paths to regime and more generally political transformation. This 
also has implications for how local agency is understood, as this literature relays the post-
World War II political history of the region as littered with memories of failure, and more 
specifically of the failure to democratise. These elements are all discussed in the first section 
of the paper. 
To address these limitations, the second section draws on two elements of Gramsci’s 
theory of history. It first expands on the limited understanding of time and transition in 
political regimes literature by drawing on Gramsci’s distinction between time as epochal 
change (fare epoca) and time as duration (durare).6 This enables us to envisage the prospect of 
transition as rupture. Then, the paper focuses on Gramsci’s notion of ‘absolute historicism’, 
which emphasises how elements of the past appear, if often in different guises, also in the 
present.7 This is turn brings into the discussion space and place as well as time, allowing us 
to explore how world-historical conditions structures the possibilities for political 
transformation, thus bringing into relief how global factors, and the hierarchies they embody 
and reproduce, shape the terrain in which local agents find themselves. Finally, Gramsci’s best 
known concept – hegemony – enables a powerful critique of liberal-procedural definitions of 
democracy. 
Once we broaden our understanding of time, transition and democracy, the third 
section explores the effects on the Middle East of the two globalisations of the late 19th and 
late 20th century, and the decolonisation in between, to understand how world-historical 
conditions have structured political time in the region, and with it the prospects of political 
                                                          
4 Guillermo O’Donnell & Philippe Schmitter (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). Karl & Schmitter, 
Modes of Transition. 
5 Robert Dahl (1989) Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 221. 
6 Antonio Gramsci (1975) Quaderni del carcere, 4 Vols (Turin: Einaudi), p. 1744. See also Peter Thomas 
(2009) The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism (Leiden: Brill), pp. 152-3. 
7 Antonio Gramsci (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Q. Hoare & G. 
Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart), pp. 465. See also Adam D. Morton (2007) Unravelling 




transformation. In addition to illustrating the potential of Gramsci’s theory of history, this 
section also outlines how the limitations of political regimes literature weaken its ability to 
full grasp the implications of the Arab uprisings, and their challenge to the dependent 
temporality of neoliberal globalisation. Hence, while engaging only peripherally with issues 
of memory, the critique of dominant understandings of time, transition and democracy 
provided in this paper clears the ground for approaches that forefront time and memory in 
order to discern the prospects for political change in the region, as it happens in the remainder 
of this special issue. 
 
Making new sense of the old limits of political regimes literature 
The Arab uprisings have led to a resurgence of the three main strands of democratisation 
theory, respectively rooted in modernisation theory, pluralist elite theory and historical 
sociology.8 As events in the region unfolded, optimism and buoyancy have been replaced by 
cynicism and a return towards emphasising the obstacles to democratic transition.9 Such a 
shift is inserted in a well-known pattern of waves of optimism and pessimism in the scholarly 
analysis of the democratic prospects of the region.10 In the 1990s, this produced confident 
claims about looming democratisation following measures of limited political liberalisation,11 
whereas the swing of the pendulum in the opposite direction in the following decade was 
interpreted with reference to the resilience and adaptability of Middle Eastern authoritarian 
regimes.12 
Notwithstanding major differences in their analysis of empirical developments, both 
democratisation and authoritarian persistence literature focusing on the Middle East are 
trapped in the same paradogma.13 Two of the resulting limitations are especially relevant 
                                                          
8 Jean Grugel & Matthew L. Bishop (2013) Democratization: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan), pp. 75-96. For each tradition, see respectively Stepan & Linz, Democratization Theory; 
Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud & Andrew Reynolds (2013) Why the Modest Harvest?, Journal of 
Democracy, 24(4), pp. 29-44; Jamie Allinson (2015) Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A 
Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, Democratization, 22(2), pp. 294-314. 
9 Eva Bellin (2012) Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from 
the Arab Spring, Comparative Politics, 44(2), pp. 127-149; Brownlee et al., Modest Harvest. 
10 Morten Valbjørn & André Bank (2010) Examining the ‘Post’ in Post-Democratization: The Future of 
Middle Eastern Political Rule through Lenses of the Past, Middle East Critique, 19(3), pp. 183-200. 
11 Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany & Paul Noble (eds.) (1995) Political Liberalization and Democratization in 
the Arab World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner); Augustus R. Norton (1993) The Future of Civil Society in the 
Middle East, Middle East Journal, 47(2), pp. 205-216. 
12 Jason Brownlee (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press); Oliver Schlumberger (ed.) (2007) Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and 
Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford: Stanford University Press); Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats. 
13 Morten Valbjørn (2014) Three Ways of Revisiting the (Post-)Democratization Debate after the Arab 
Uprisings, Mediterranean Politics, 19(1), pp. 157-160. 
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within the scope of this paper. First, as the conditions for democratic transition are assumed 
to be located within the social formation,14 with international actors and factors conceived at 
most as external enablers or disablers through the use of leverage and linkages,15 these bodies 
of literature are marred by methodological nationalism. Analytically, this puts them at a 
disadvantage when addressing the extent to which global transformations have restructured 
Middle Eastern states and societies. While this does not mean that local dynamics have 
become a mere reflection of global changes, it implies that local possibilities for regime 
transition can only be adequately assessed within a global context. This is extremely difficult 
through dominant approaches to democratic transition, as in its early stages democratisation 
theory tended to see the political future of peripheral countries as mirroring the past of 
advanced states,16 while more recently it has assessed the prospects of democratic transition 
through third-wave experiences.17 In both cases, the prospects of regime change are abstracted 
from global political and economic hierarchies. 
Second, largely because of the formative influence of the Cold War on American 
political science, democratisation literature tends to suffer from a liberal bias. Lisa Anderson 
outlined how this resulted analytically in a narrow focus on parliaments, parties, elections 
and other liberal institutions.18 However, the liberal bias also has normative implications for 
how transition and democracy are understood. The former is conceptualised in gradualist 
terms, and hence revolutionary ruptures can lead to democratisation to the extent in which 
they can be channelled back towards negotiated settlements typical of third-wave 
transitions.19 Democracy is instead defined in a ‘monolithically liberal and narrowly 
procedural fashion’,20 and hence as the sum of free, fair and competitive elections, legal 
equality and freedom of information, expression and association. In turn, the narrowing down 
                                                          
14 Mohammed Ayoob (2005) The Muslim World’s Poor Record of Modernization and Democratization: 
The Interplay of External and Internal Factors, in S. Hunter & H. Malick (eds.) Modernization, Democracy, 
and Islam (Westport: Praeger), p. 187. 
15 Lucan Way & Steven Levitsky (2007) Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide, East 
European Politics and Societies, 21(1), pp. 48-66. 
16 Such an approach is at the heart of political development theory, heavily influential in the late 1960s 
and 1970s. See Paul Cammack (1994) Political Development Theory and the Dissemination of 
Democracy, Democratization, 1(2), pp. 353-374. Then, the extent to which even the past of core countries 
on which these theories draw is an idealised version of the actual past is the subject of a great study in 
historical sociology. See Sandra Halperin (1997) In the Mirror of the Third World: Capitalist Development 
in Modern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
17 Stepan & Linz, Democratization Theory; Abushouk, The Arab Spring. 
18 Lisa Anderson (2006) Searching Where the Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle 
East, Annual Review of Political Science, 9, pp. 189-214. 
19 Schmitter & Sika, Democratization, p. 457-58. 
20 Andrea Teti (2012) What Lies Beyond the Wub: The Challenges of (Post)Democratization, Middle East 
Critique, 21(1), p. 18. 
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of the meaning of both transition as process and democracy as end point entails the a priori 
identification of a trajectory where transition gradually leads from authoritarian rule to liberal 
democracy.21The liberal bias also matters because, by positing an ontological separation 
between politics and the economy, it has historically based the study of democratic transitions 
on the implicit assumption that democracy is only possible within capitalist social relations, 
and hence democratic transitions can only occur within or towards capitalism. 
In the Middle East methodological nationalism meets Orientalism, thus turning into a 
form of ‘methodological regionalism’ that affects both democratisation and authoritarian 
persistence literature. During the third wave in Latin America, East Asia, Central and Eastern 
Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa, political regime scholarship accounted for the Middle 
Eastern ‘exception’ by focusing on what is missing or wrong with the region, invoking the 
supposed cultural exceptionalism of the Arab world, variously linked to Islam, neopatriarchy, 
and mass passivity.22 Other sources of regional exceptionalism have been identified in the 
post-colonial legacies on state formation;23 a traditionally weak civil society in the face of a 
strong coercive apparatus;24 and a state-dominated economy, which in oil-rich countries takes 
the form of a rentier state.25 Hence, the causes for the absence of democratic transitions in the 
region have been localised and essentialised, bothflattening out intra-regional complexity,26 
and glorifying democratic transitions elsewhere, neglecting their own precariousness and 
‘incompleteness’.27 Even the literature maintaining that we should be looking for explanations 
‘less in absent prerequisites of democratization and more in present conditions that foster 
robust authoritarianism’28 only partly addresses these limitations, as it is still concerned with 
local factors preventing the unfolding of democratic transitions in the region, thus challenging 
                                                          
21 Michel Camau (2002) Sociétés civiles ‘réelles’ et téléologie de la democratisation, Revue Internationale 
d'Economie Politique, 9(2), pp. 213–232; Teti, What Lies Beyond, pp. 18-19. 
22 See respectively Elie Kedourie (1992) Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington, Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy); Hisham Sharabi (1988) Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab 
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Samuel Huntington (1984) Will More Countries Become 
Democratic?, Political Science Quarterly, 99(2), pp. 193-218. 
23 Simon Bromley (1994) Rethinking Middle East Politics (Austin: University of Texas Press). 
24 Yahya Sadowski (1993) The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate, Middle East Report, 183, pp. 
14-21. 
25 Hazem Beblawi & Giacomo Luciani (eds.) (1987) The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm). 
26 For instance paying insufficient attention to the cases of Arab democracy, such as Lebanon, and to 
the cases in which political opening, if not necessarily democratisation, was shut down with vast 
international support, as in Algeria. 
27 Visible especially in the proliferation of democracies ‘with adjectives’ to describe limitations of third-
wave democracies. See David Collier & Steven Levitsky (1997) Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual 
Innovation in Comparative Research, World Politics, 49(3), pp. 430-451. 




the teleology of transition on empirical grounds but essentially accepting its epistemological 
legitimacy. 
The inadequate conceptualisation of political time in both democratisation and 
authoritarian persistence literature might have something to do with these limitations. Both 
traditions subscribe to an understanding of time as chronos, that is: ‘time as quantitatively 
measurable duration’, which can be associated both with ‘time as linear, infinite succession’ 
and ‘with the inevitable birth-death life cycle of individuals’.29 Whether linear or cyclical, this 
temporality is characterised by measurability and divisibility along the same axis of duration. 
In democratisation literature, this is seen, much like transition, in terms of ‘complex 
linearity’.30 In authoritarian persistence literature, political time is still continuous but also 
continuously repeating itself, either through Lampedusa’s moto ‘if we want things to stay as 
they are things will have to change’,31 or through ‘an eternal cycle of authoritarianism and 
war’.32 Either way, much like in García Márquez’ Macondo, time that passes but yet stands 
still enables the emergence of ‘a timeless realm in which myth can exist’:33 in the Middle East, 
the myth of ‘the stable Orient’.34 There are however times in which such duration breaks down, 
or is at least challenged, opening to the possibility of different temporalities and futurities. 
Classical Greek philosophers would call this ‘transformational time for action’ kairos.35 
Dominant approaches to regime transition appear to neglect this possibility of temporal 
disruption, and in turn of transition as rupture. 
If political time is understood as continuous, either in terms of linearity or cyclicality, 
we are then left either with the reproduction of authoritarian rule or with democratic 
transition. If the latter is further narrowed down as we have seen, we can see how, in an age 
in which transnational economic entanglements might lead to capital flight, gradualism paves 
the way to framing democratisation as a trade-off between political transformation and 
economic stability. Insofar as the latter is embedded within, and defined through, capitalist 
                                                          
29 Kimberly Hutchings (2008) Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press), p. 5. 
30 Teti, What Lies Beyond, p. 12. 
31 Morten Valbjørn (2015) Reflections on Self-Reflections: On Framing the Analytical Implications of the 
Arab Uprisings for the Study of Arab Politics, Democratization, 22(2), pp. 218-238. 
32 Schmitter & Sika, Democratization, p. 443. 
33 Robert L. Sims (1976) García Márquez’ “La Hojarasca”: Paradigm of Time and Search for Myth, 
Hispania, 59(4), pp. 810-819. 
34 Morten Valbjørn (2012) Upgrading Post-Democratization Studies: Examining a Re-politicized Arab 
World in a Transition to Somewhere, Middle East Critique, 21(1), p. 27. 
35 Hutchings, Time, p. 5. 
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social relations, then gradualism might well be seen as aiming to prolong the duration of a 
singular temporality, that of capitalist time.  
This narrow understanding of time, transition and democracy identifies the parameters 
for knowledge production on regime change and shapes the study of political agency in the 
Middle East. Dominant literature portrays the political history of the Middle East since 
decolonisation as littered with memories of failure to become democratic, with its causes 
localised and essentialised. As a result, agency from below is usually devalued as an engine 
of lasting political transformations, when not demeaned and infantilised altogether. This 
happens for instance in the literature that sees popular agency during the uprisings as 
distorted by cognitive biases that prevented protesters from grasping their limited chances of 
success.36 Similar comments have at times been inscribed within ‘a logic of superiority and 
subjugation’,37 for instance when Schmitter and Sika argue that popular mobilisations in the 
Arab world have failed to learn from third-wave transitions to instead fall back on ‘the 
previously dominant modes of transition’,38 characterised by largely outdated anti-ancient 
régime mass protests.  
Insofar as they challenge the definition of time as continuous, of transition as necessarily 
gradual, and of democracy in liberal-procedural terms, the Arab uprisings present themselves 
as a possible epistemic rupture, introducing the space for thinking time, transition and 
democracy differently. As this opportunity is yet to be grasped by democratisation and 
authoritarian persistence literature alike, through reference to Gramsci the rest of this paper 
attempts to do just that.  
 
Gramsci and the globally situated temporalities of transition 
This section outlines how Gramsci’s theory of history permits an exploration of kairos, of 
ruptural time, that, in addition to expanding the ways in which we can think of time and 
transition, also overcomes the methodological nationalism of political regimes literature 
insofar as it inserts and embeds the local within a global context. Additionally, insofar as 
hegemony emerges in Gramsci’s work also as a critique of liberal democracy, it allows us to 
think substantially about democratisation. 
                                                          
36 Kurt Weyland (2012) The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave 
of 1848?, Perspectives on Politics, 10(4), pp. 917-934. 
37 Larbi Sadiki (2009) Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), p. vii. 
38 Ibid, p. 458. 
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Gramsci’s theory of history is undoubtedly more complex than the prevalent 
understanding of how Marxist thought sees history. On the one hand, via the work of Italian 
idealist Benedetto Croce, Gramsci was influenced by Hegel’s view of history as necessity and 
as dialectical progression towards the realisation of freedom, but he was also critical of its 
teleological tendencies. In this regard, Gramsci recalls Goethe’s epigram: ‘cork [raw material] 
was not born to made cork [to seal bottles]’.39 According to Gramsci, this teleological element 
often leads Croce to produce ‘history by design’, rather than rigorous historical analysis. On 
the other hand, Gramsci was also fascinated by the work of late 18th century thinker 
Giambattista Vico, praised because ‘he was able to conceive the vast world from a dead little 
corner of history’.40 Unlike Hegel Vico also lends a significant weight to human agency and 
contingency, if ultimately inserted within a cyclical view of civilisations. Two elements in 
Gramsci’s theory of history, especially relevant within the context of this paper, allow him to 
synthesise and overcome Hegel and Vico. 
Firstly, Gramsci develops a distinction between ‘duration’ and ‘epochal change’, not 
unlike the one outlined above between chronos and kairos. After presenting passive revolution 
as the structural transformation of a social formation that dominant forces carry out through 
state power in a way that fundamentally consolidates the status quo,41 Gramsci suggests that 
this process prolongs the duration of an epoch (durare), but is unable to establish a new 
historical epoch (fare epoca).42 This opens the possibility of moving beyond the singular 
temporality of political regimes scholarship in the Middle East. Gramsci’s distinction is rooted 
within a Marxist understanding of the dynamics of capitalist development as an inherently 
global process. From this perspective, the more productive forces develop under capitalist 
social relations, the more fragile and provisional the attempts to restore duration will be, and 
the more global and international factors will condition the possibilities for local agency. Such 
a view resonates with the geographical literature on uneven development, and especially with 
David Harvey’s account of globalisation as a process of ‘time-space compression’.43 
                                                          
39 Ironically, unlike in Italian, English language internalises this teleology, as it uses cork to refer to both 
the raw material (in Italian, sughero) and its most common final product (tappo). See Antonio Gramsci 
(1975), Quaderni del carcere, 4 Vols. (Turin: Einaudi), p. 1450. 
40 Antonio Gramsci (2007) Prison Notebooks, Vol. 2, edited and translated by J. Buttigieg (New York: 
Columbia University Press), p. 232. 
41 Roberto Roccu (2017) Passive Revolution Revisited: From the Prison Notebooks to Our ‘Great and 
Terrible World’, Capital & Class, 41(3), pp. 537-559. 
42 Gramsci, Quaderni, p. 1744. See also Peter Thomas (2009) The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Heegmony 
and Marxism (Leiden: Brill), pp. 152-53, which draws a parallel between Gramsci’s fare epoca and 
Benjamin’s Jetztzeit.  
43 David Harvey (1989) The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 240-42. 
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Secondly, the distinctiveness of Gramsci’s theory of history has often been identified in 
his references to ‘absolute historicism’,44 to be intended not as ‘absolutely historicist’ but as 
both ‘absolute’ and ‘historicist’.45 The first term refers to how past processes might have 
kernels that reappear in the present, thus revealing their organic, as opposed to contingent, 
nature within history, which endows them with the possibility of experiencing ‘afterlives’.46 
‘Historicist’ refers instead to the immanent, but not predetermined, possibilities for 
development within the historical process. Inserted within the considerations above on the 
ever-greater relevance of global determinants in capitalist development, absolute historicism 
implies that similarities between past and present must be seen within, and related to, a 
changing global context. In addition to providing a dialectical synthesis of Hegel’s and Vico’s 
understandings of time and progress, this reference to the global also provides a much needed 
antidote to the methodological nationalism of political regimes literature.  
Additionally, if separately, hegemony is developed by Gramsci also as a critique of 
liberal conceptions of democracy,47 as it focuses on the substantive advancements for 
subaltern groups provided by a hegemonic class. This position shines through especially in 
Gramsci’s engagement with both Marxist authors and the elitist tradition of Mosca, Michels 
and Pareto. Here, Gramsci criticises the liberal-procedural definition of democracy, within 
which ‘the historicist rationality of numerical consent is systematically undermined by the 
influence of wealth’.48 He also calls for ‘“democratic” forms that are more substantial than the 
formal “democracy” of the present time’,49 pointing towards a conception of democracy that 
encompasses a socio-economic dimension, necessary to create the avenues for the individual 
and collective emancipation of subaltern groups. 
In sum, Gramsci’s theory of history helps us make new sense of the relation between 
time and transition in two ways. On the one hand, through the opposition between duration 
and epochal change it creates room for thinking of transition as rupture of (capitalist) time. 
This in turn enables us to avoid presenting democracy and democratisation as exclusively 
linked to a transition towards or within capitalism, and to envisage democratisation as the 
emergence of a new historical epoch beyond the temporality of capitalist social relations. On 
the other hand, Gramsci’s absolute historicism encourages an excavation of the past to 
                                                          
44 Gramsci, Quaderni, p. 1437. 
45 Adam D. Morton (2007) Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political 
Economy (London: Pluto Press), pp. 24-36. 
46 See Sara Salem’s contribution to this special issue. 
47 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Vol. 3, p. 345. 
48 Gramsci, Quaderni, p. 1625. 
49 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Vol. 3, p. 126. 
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understand the present and chart possible futures, while retaining a focus on the shaping 
power of world-historical conditions. With reference to the prospects for democratic 
transformation in the Middle East, this excavation is at the heart of the next section, which 
looks at the conditions for local agency during the two waves of globalisation as well as the 
post-World War II interregnum marked by decolonisation. 
 
Paths to democracy in the Middle East in a global age 
In light of the mainly theoretical-methodological contribution of this piece, and of the 
mismatch between a very long timespan and limited space to cover it, this section only 
provides an abbreviated illustration of how Gramsci’s theory of history can shed light on the 
current world-historical conjuncture, its temporality, and the possibilities of democratic 
transformation in the contemporary Middle East. 
The first globalisation, with its post-World War I tail, incorporated the Middle East in 
the world market on subordinate terms. Following the colonisation of North Africa in the 19th 
century, the fateful events of 1917 leading to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and 
including the promise of statehood to local rulers willing to take arms against the Ottomans, 
the establishment of the mandate system, and the Balfour Declation,50 all contributed to 
entrenching the temporality of capitalism within the region, and most crucially to entrench it 
as a temporality of dependency. This was constituted not only through extraction, production 
and exchange, but also through financial channels, which via indebtedness and fiscal crisis 
were central to establishing economic subordination already in the lead-up to the 1875 
Ottoman bankruptcy.51 This subordination also had very specific social correlates, with the 
emergence of a comprador bourgeoisie that allied with local landed elites provided support to 
foreign rule.52 As it established a hierarchical form of hub-and-spoke integration, this 
historical period also sowed the seeds of anticolonial nationalism,53 which will become central 
to the international relations of the Middle East following World War II. 
Situated within this global context, the limited prospects for political transformation 
become apparent.Popular opposition to the colonial project usually took the form of ‘sporadic 
and incoherent rebelliousness’ that Gramsci associated with weak and unorganised subaltern 
                                                          
50 Avi Shlaim (1995) War and Peace in the Middle East (London: Penguin), p. 11-13. 
51 Roger Owen & Şevket Pamuk (1998) A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century 
(London: I.B. Tauris), p. 6. 
52 Juan R. Cole (1999) Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt’s 
‘Urabi Movement (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press). 




classes.54 The major exception of this period, the emergence of Turkey from the ruins of the 
Ottoman Empire, contains enough idiosyncrasies to be seen as confirming rather than 
disproving the rule, from the absence of colonial rule to the centrality of elite-led, and indeed 
army-dominated, agency. In fact, this latter element prefigures what will happen in the 
majority of the Arab republics established in the wake of decolonisation. 
The dissolution of the mandate system and of colonial empires in the region, in addition 
to the emergence of an ‘Arab state system’,55 also created the space for an attempt at 
dismantling the colonial structures of economic dependency, and indeed establishing a new 
historical epoch. Local agency was central to this attempt, taking place especially in the new 
Arab republics, where the project of political and economic independence was heavily shaped 
by anticolonial nationalism.56 Crucially, while usually embodied in forms of elite agency, and 
often of military coups, this liberation project enjoyed a high degree of popular support.57 
However, this hegemonic element at best only ameliorated the antinomies of anticolonial 
nationalism. If the colonial era saw a very clear-cut opposition between exploited popular 
masses in the Middle East and colonial exploiters, with only a narrow section of the local 
population benefitting from the colonial political economy, in its historical manifestation 
anticolonial nationalism privileged one side of the emancipatory agenda over the other. 
Whereas anticolonialism was essential to the struggle against imperialism, and hence for 
achieving a measure of external emancipation, the appeal to the nation stifled and 
marginalised demands for emancipation within the state. This resulted not only in the 
repression of internal dissent, but also in measures that, while socially and economically 
progressive, presented themselves as the top-down concessions of a paternalistic state. Hence, 
while the so-called ‘bread democracy’ (dimuqratiyyat al-khubz)58 met the basic economic 
demands of the population through some redistribution, a necessary but insufficient 
component of substantive democratisation, it did so at the expense of political rights and more 
generally genuine political emancipation within the social formation: the promised epoch of 
emancipation was born amputated, rendering its challenge to the capitalist temporality of 
dependency inherently vulnerable. 
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56 See Alina Sajed on Third Worldism in this special issue. 
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Following the crushing defeat of the anticolonial challenge in the late 1960s, the 
transnationalisation of finance and production in the following decade provided the context 
within which the structures and strictures of the first globalisation were re-established in the 
Middle East, if under new conditions.59 Under the combined threat of debt crisis and capital 
flight, governments of oil-scarce countries especially have been disciplined into abandoning 
import-substitution industrialisation, returning to international financial markets for 
borrowing. Whenever occurring, fiscal crises have been exploited to force an economic 
restructuring that, in the name of outward-orientation, has favoured international investors 
through privatisations and the liberalisation of trade, capital account and foreign direct 
investment, which in turn have contributed to integrating the Middle East in the global 
political economy on subordinate terms. The social correlate of these economic 
transformations has been the ‘re-compradorisation’ of the ruling classes of the region.60 If 
relations of economic dependency with core social formations have been re-established, there 
are also at least two genuinely new features of relevance to this paper. Firstly, if the colonial 
subordination of the first globalisation was both formal and substantive, we now have Middle 
Eastern states that are formally independent, but lack ‘effective independence’.61 Secondly, 
the systematic investment of oil revenues in advanced financial markets has created the 
foundations for the emergence of a structure not only of global but also of regional 
dependency, as witnessed by the ever-greater interference of oil-rich states in the domestic 
affairs of oil-scarce ones.62 Here, one can see how the pondered historical analogy implied by 
absolute historicism uncovers the reassertion of the past, in terms of economic dependency, 
but also new specificities of its manifestation. 
How does this global context affect the prospects for political transformation in the 
region? The economic results of this subordinate integration are well known, in the form of 
greater exposure to global shocks,63 limited gains from integration in global markets,64 which 
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additionally are distributed extremely unevenly, as are its costs.65 This is the context of the 
Arab uprisings, which in turn demonstrated the possibilities for democratic transformation in 
the region. Yet, without in any way wanting to underestimate its achievements, the success 
story of the uprisings – Tunisia – also demonstrates the limits of third-wave transitions in the 
contemporary Middle East. Here, mass protests were followed by negotiations among 
competing elites leading to the establishment of the institutions of liberal democracy.66 This 
success, however, has meant neglecting socio-economic demands and confirming a 
subordinate position within the global economy. Following the trajectory of third-wave 
democracies, the Tunisian revolution has been channelled onto a gradualist and procedural 
path, which especially since the rise of Nidaa’ Tounes sees a reincorporation of elites from the 
Ben Ali era. In many respects this resembles the passive revolutions evoked by Gramsci, in 
which the internal and external relations of force and dependence that led to the uprisings are 
reproduced rather than challenged. Thus, even the more successful case appears as yet 
another transition restoring the duration of the old temporality rather than establishing a new 
one, and indeed adapting the pace, scope and degree of political change to the requirements 
of economic stability, and hence of capitalist time. 
Analytically, the combination of methodological nationalism and a narrow 
understanding of time, transition and democracy prevent democratisation from adequately 
accounting for the current conjuncture. The national bourgeoisie often considered as the 
engine of democratic transformation in the region takes the form of rentier elites in the Gulf 
and of ‘compradors’ elsewhere. Under the twin attack of state repression and lower protection 
to attract foreign investment, organised workers, historically the most consistent pro-
democracy group,67 have also been dramatically weakened. The middle class lauded by first-
generation democratisation theory has itself been impoverished.68 The polarisation produced 
by the dramatic increase in inequality has in turn eroded that middle ground that 
transitologists consider key to the compromise between soft-liners in both regime and 
opposition.69 In sum, the very globalisation hailed for initiating the third wave of 
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democratisation appears to have in the long run undermined the social preconditions for 
gradual democratic transitions in the Middle East. 
If also the most successful transition in the region rests on shaky foundations, and if the 
latest globalisation has produced such devastating socio-economic transformations, this need 
not lead us to the pessimistic conclusions of the authoritarian persistence literature. Both 
history and peculiarities of the current conjuncture suggest that regime change is possible, but 
has chances of consolidation only if embedded in broader social, political and economic 
transformations. Especially in the decades following decolonisation, history has 
demonstrated that the material advancement of poorer social groups can be, and is possibly 
better, achieved when the state obtains some measure of effective independence from the core 
of the global economy. Within the current conjuncture, the crisis of the liberal global order 
that worries Anglo-American commentators so much might broaden the scope for deeper 
political transformations in the region.70 If, as outlined above, the main problem of real-
existing anticolonial nationalism was its pursuit of emancipation from dominant global 
powers at the expense of domestic social emancipation, some of the unintended consequences 
of neoliberal globalisation might hold major implications. If rising inequality erodes the 
middle ground, making gradual and moderate transitions harder, in oil-scarce states 
especially it produces social and often also geographical polarisation, which in turn reduces 
social fragmentation, for instance between impoverished middle classes, however defined, 
weaker organised labour, and burgeoning ‘informal proletariat’.71 This embryonic subaltern 
alliance was at the heart of the Arab uprisings, and put forward demands that were political 
and economic, formal and substantive at once.72 The Tunisian case shows that liberal-
procedural democracy implies a reaffirmation of subordination to the material and temporal 
imperatives of neoliberal globalisation, and is thus unable to fulfil the socio-economic 
demands of the uprisings. As the gradualist path is occluded as well as limited in its 
substantive outcomes, transitions in the Middle East might have to pursue political and 
economic emancipation at once, within the social formation as well as in its relations with the 
global economy. This entails delivering on the twin promise of the anticolonial movement, 
reviving its once defeated challenge to the temporality of capitalism and the global and 
regional relations of dependency stemming thereof. 
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If, following Gramsci, we are willing to look at the past through the lens of absolute 
historicism, and to think of possible futures beyond the current epoch and its duration, then 
we might overcome the strictures, analytical and normative at once, of democratisation 
theory, which also affect the literature on authoritarian persistence in the region. Insofar as it 
is open to the possibility of political time as discontinuous, of transition as abrupt, and of 
democracy as understood beyond its liberal-procedural definition, this approach allows us to 
envisage alternative paths to regime, and more broadly political, transformation. Hence, as 
much as it sounds daunting, recasting transition as rupture, as a fleeting moment for 
transcending the temporality of capitalism, promises to create the room for the individual and 
collective emancipation of subaltern classes across the Middle East. 
While memory only plays a marginal role in this paper, the critique and contestation of 
dominant understandings of time and transition is an inescapable starting point for 
investigating how specific states and social groups have developed individual and collective 
memories of the past, and how they have sought to mobilise them for political purposes. In 
this regard, this paper contributes to the current special issue in three ways. Firstly, it shows 
how dominant literature has narrowed down the possible meanings of political time, 
transition and democracy. As collective memory is inevitably affected by dominant narratives 
of the past,73 then the latter tends to restrict the horizons of political transformation towards a 
dichotomy between continuity and gradual change along a preordained path. Secondly, as it 
broadens the discussion of political time beyond chronos and duration and towards kairos and 
epochal change, this paper also enables an exploration of discontinuous, ruptural and 
substantive political transformations, with regime change conceived as only part of a broader 
structural transformation. Finally, through Gramsci’s absolute historicism, this paper also 
addresses the extent to which the two main waves of globalisationhave shaped the scope for 
political agency in the Middle East by subordinating the region to the needs of the core of the 
global economy. As a result, the temporality of capitalism in the Middle East has historically 
been a temporality of dependency. The promise to break up with this dependency on the part 
of the anticolonial regimes following decolonisation was only partially fulfilled, and as the 
project was defeated the temporality of capitalism was reasserted, as were its constraints on 
the speed, scope and direction of political transformation. As they challenged these 
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constraints, the Arab uprisings have reignited the hopes of a democratic transition. And while 
democratisation literature tends to prioritise the institutions and procedures of liberal 
democracy at the expense of socio-economic concerns, transformations within and beyond the 
region suggest that democratic transition in the Middle East might well take a ruptural, as 
opposed to gradualist, form, and that democracy itself might have to be both political and 
economic, for it to respond to both the demands of the popular classes and the socio-economic 
transformations brought about by globalisation, that is: for democratisation to provide the 
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